This paper studies models of credit with limited commitment and, therefore, endogenous debt limits. There are multiple stationary equilibria plus nonstationary equilibria in which credit conditions change simply because of beliefs. There can be equilibria in which debt limits display deterministic cyclic or chaotic dynamics, as well as stochastic ðsunspotÞ equilibria in which they fluctuate randomly, even though fundamentals are deterministic and time invariant. Examples and applications are discussed. We also consider different mechanisms for determining the terms of trade and compare the setup to other credit models in the literature.
As we have seen, all financial institutions are at the mercy of our innate inclination to veer from euphoria to despondency. ðNiall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money ½2008Þ
I. Introduction
Are credit markets susceptible to animal spirits, self-fulfilling prophecies, and endogenous fluctuations? This is different from asking if there are channels in credit markets that amplify or propagate fluctuations driven by fundamental factors, as emphasized in the literature surveyed by Gertler and Kiyotaki ð2010Þ. In this paper, we show that even if fundamentals are deterministic and time invariant, economies with credit market frictions can display cyclic, chaotic, and stochastic dynamics driven purely by beliefs. The key friction is limited commitment, which leads to endogenous borrowing constraints. 1 While most studies of these kinds of models focus on stationary equilibria, we show that economies with commitment frictions not only generate multiple steady states, with different credit conditions and allocations, but also display equilibria in which credit conditions and allocations vary over time, even when fundamentals do not. This is true when the terms of trade are determined by Walrasian pricing or by generalized Nash bargaining, although the economic forces generating dynamics in economies with the two pricing mechanisms are very different.
With limited commitment, agents honor their debt obligations to avoid punishment by exclusion from future credit. If one believes that one's debt limit in the future will be 0, one has nothing to lose by reneging on current obligations, which makes the equilibrium debt limit 0 today. Hence there is always a no-credit equilibrium. Generally, there is also a steady-state equilibrium with a positive debt limit. To explain how we get cycles, we find it useful to first build some intuition by considering a competitive labor market. Let the unconstrained equilibrium hours and wages be ð' * ; w * Þ. Suppose that we impose an exogenous restriction ' ≤ f, where f 5 ' * 2 ε with ε > 0. There are two effects on workers: , goes down and w goes up. The first effect has a second-order impact on their utility, by the envelope theorem, if ε is not too big. The increase in 1 By modeling debt limits endogenously using limited commitment, we follow Kehoe and Levine ð1993, 2001Þ and Alvarez and Jermann ð2000Þ . See Azariadis and Kass ð2007, 2013Þ, Lorenzoni ð2008Þ, Hellwig and Lorenzoni ð2009Þ, and Sanches and Williamson ð2010Þ for related work. As discussed in more detail below, our setup differs somewhat from the usual limited-commitment model and is based on a framework we use elsewhere to study banking ðGu et al. 2013Þ . While there are no banks here, the setup is used because it is tractable and flexible. In particular, we have production and investment because we think that it may be interesting to see how these vary over the credit cycle; but as we show, the model can be reinterpreted as a Kehoe-Levine pure-endowment economy or as some other standard credit models.
w, however, generates a first-order increase in utility. This is why unions want to increase w and lower ,, compared to a competitive market. Of course, no individual worker can affect w in a competitive market, but an outside ðe.g., union or policyÞ restriction on , can generate a wageincreasing effect. 2 Now consider a competitive credit market. No individual borrower can affect the terms of his loan by taking on less debt than his unconstrained equilibrium choice, say y * . But if all borrowers face a constraint y ≤ f 5 y * 2 ε, as long as ε is not too big, they are all better off because the improvement in the terms of trade implies a first-order increase in utility, while the impact of the reduction in y is second order, again by the envelope theorem. Once this is understood, credit cycles emerge as follows. If you believe that the debt limit tomorrow will decrease somewhat, but not too much, your utility will increase tomorrow. This makes you more reluctant to renege on current debt because you do not want to be shut out of tomorrow's market. The reluctance to renege makes today's endogenous debt limit high. Tomorrow, you believe that the debt limit the next day will go back up. This makes you worse off the day after tomorrow, again by the envelope theorem. So tomorrow you are more inclined to renege, and this makes tomorrow's debt limit low. There is thus a natural tendency for credit conditions to oscillate in a two-period cycle. Higherorder cycles, chaotic dynamics, and sunspot equilibria are more complicated versions of the same idea.
A bilateral bargaining model can generate similar results for completely different reasons. Generalized Nash bargaining has the property that the surplus of both parties need not increase with the total surplus: one agent's surplus must rise but the other's may fall ðsee Aruoba, Rocheteau, and Waller ½2007 for an extended discussionÞ. When a borrower is negotiating over the terms of a loan, he can therefore be worse off if his debt limit goes up. This is different from the envelope-theoretic reasoning in Walrasian markets but still implies credit cycles: if your debt limit goes up, you can be worse off when negotiating tomorrow's credit contract, justifying a low limit today, and so on. Note that there cannot be cycles in the model with take-it-or-leave-it offers by the borrower or with Kalai's proportional bargaining solution, both of which imply that the borrower's surplus must increase with his debt limit. But with generalized Nash bargaining, as is the case with Walrasian pricing, borrowers can be better off when debt limits tighten. In either case, in contrast to the labor market example, in credit markets we do not need outside forces such as unions or government to impose the relevant quantity restriction: limited commitment delivers this as an equilibrium outcome.
The rest of the paper involves making this precise and providing the proofs. Before beginning, we mention that, as is well known, similar dynamics emerge in monetary models. In particular, the no-credit equilibrium is reminiscent of the nonmonetary equilibrium that always exists with fiat currency. The economic forces are different here. At the risk of oversimplifying, the basic mechanism at work in those models is a backward-bending savings function. The key economic mechanism at work in our model-payoffs decreasing as quantity constraints are relaxed-is different. 3
II. The Model
Time is discrete and continues forever. Each period has two subperiods. There are equal measures of two types of agents. Type 1 agents consume and type 2 agents produce a good x in the first subperiod. Type 1 agents produce an intermediate good in the first subperiod and invest it, to generate a gross return y that type 2 agents like to consume in the second subperiod. There are gains from trade using the following credit relationship: type 1 agents ðborrowersÞ get x now from type 2 agents ðlendersÞ and promise to deliver y later, when their investments come to fruition. Only type 1 agents have access to the investment opportunity. The utility from this arrangement is U 1 ðx; yÞ for type 1 and U 2 ðy; xÞ for type 2, where U j is strictly increasing in the first argument, which is j's consumption, and strictly decreasing in the second, which is j's production. Utility is also concave and twice differentiable and satisfies U j ð0; 0Þ 5 0 ðwhich can be relaxedÞ. We also assume normal goods for some results.
The key friction in the model is limited commitment: rather than honor his obligation to deliver y in the second subperiod, type 1 may abscond with or otherwise divert the investment returns for his own purposes, as in Biais et al. ð2007Þ or DeMarzo and Fishman ð2007Þ. If type 1 behaves opportunistically in this way, he gets a payoff ly over and above U 1 ðx; yÞ. Therefore, l parameterizes the temptation to renege. We im-3 See Azariadis ð1993Þ for an overview and references to primary sources on money and dynamics in the overlapping-generations tradition, see Woodford ð1986, 1988Þ for models with exogenous cash-in-advance or borrowing constraints, and see Matsuyama ð1990Þ for money in the utility function. Boldrin and Woodford ð1990Þ provide a survey of related work. Matsuyama ð2013Þ provides an alternative approach, as does Myerson ð2012, 2013Þ. There is also work on dynamics in growth models with externalities ðsee, e.g., some of the papers in the Benhabib ½1992 volumeÞ; there are no such externalities in our model. Sanches and Williamson ð2010Þ also comment on a similarity between money and credit models and particularly on the no-credit equilibrium. Although we learned a lot from their analysis about credit markets, generally, Sanches and Williamson do not study dynamics, which is the main point of this paper. pose U 1 ðx; y 1 y 0 Þ 1 ly 0 ≤ U 1 ðx; yÞ for all x, y, y 0 ≥ 0. This says that it is never efficient ex ante for type 1 to divert y 0 because he is better off not producing/investing in the first place. However, he may be tempted to divert resources ex post, after the production cost is sunk. Incentive compatibility requires trade to be self-enforcing: U j must be nonnegative for both agents, and we have to ensure compliance by type 1 in the second subperiod. The incentive to honor his obligation comes from the threat to exclude type 1 from future credit, which gives him an autarky payoff normalized to zero. Because it is useful in applications and examples, we allow imperfect monitoring: a defaulting type 1 agent gets caught only with probability p. 4 Let V j t be type j's value function at t given an allocation ðx t ; y t Þ, which we call a credit contract, since it specifies that type 1 gets ðtype 2 givesÞ x now and type 1 repays ðtype 2 receivesÞ y later. Let b ∈ ð0; 1Þ be the discount factor across periods. Discounting across subperiods is subsumed in the U j notation. Then 5
A feasible contract must satisfy the participation constraints in the first subperiod,
The critical condition is the repayment constraint for type 1 in the second subperiod,
The left-hand side of ð4Þ is type 1's instantaneous deviation payoff ly t plus the continuation value: with probability p, he is caught and excluded from future markets; with probability 1 2 p, he is not caught and continues in good standing. It is convenient to rewrite ð4Þ as 4 As mentioned, this environment is taken from Gu et al. ð2013Þ , where we discuss imperfect monitoring in more detail. But there we study only the incentive-feasible set in the spirit of mechanism design, while here we study price-taking and bargaining equilibria. To be clear, we do not need p < 1 for any general results, but it can be useful in applications and examples. 5 These equations are sometimes referred to as "promise-keeping constraints" in the related literature.
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where f t ; ðbp=lÞV 1 t11 is the debt limit. Using ð1Þ, we can express this recursively to make it clear that the debt limit in one period depends on the debt limit in the next period:
We consider both competitive markets and search-and-bargaining markets, but to ease the presentation, we present only the former in the text and relegate the latter to Appendix B. Thus, each period, everyone is assigned to one of a large number of spatially distinct Walrasian markets, where they trade short-term ðacross subperiodÞ credit contracts taking prices as given. 6 Let y be the numeraire. Then type 1 maximizes utility given his budget and credit constraints. We drop the participation constraint because autarky is always feasible: max xt ;yt U 1 ðx t ; y t Þ subject to p t x t 5 y t and ð5Þ:
Meanwhile, type 2, with no repayment issues, solves
Let ðx * ; y * Þ denote equilibrium ignoring the repayment constraint, the solution to
If y * ≤ f t , we can implement the unconstrained allocation ðx * ; y * Þ. Otherwise equilibrium is constrained: y t 5 f t and x t 5 hðf t Þ is the solution to ð10Þ with y t 5 f t .
Since x * 5 hðy * Þ, equilibrium can be represented as follows:
if f t < y * ; then x t 5 hðf t Þ and y t 5 f t ;
if f t ≥ y * ; then x t 5 hðy * Þ and y t 5 y * : ð11Þ
It will be useful below to note the following: when y t ≤ f t is binding, x t is not necessarily increasing in f, since the sign of yx yf 5 h 0 ðfÞ 5 2
is ambiguous. More importantly, the sign of
is ambiguous. As we show below, yU 1 =yf < 0 is not only possible but inevitable for some f. Hence, a borrower's payoff can decrease with his credit limit. Following Alvarez and Jermann ð2000Þ, for all t, the equilibrium debt limit f t is defined as follows: type 1 is indifferent between repaying f t and defaulting. In any feasible allocation, payoffs, and hence f t , must be bounded ðso, as in many other models, we rule out explosive bubblesÞ. We can also bound x t and y t without loss in generality. Hence we have the following definition.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is given by nonnegative and bounded sequences of credit limits ff t gt 51 and credit contracts fx t ; y t gt 51 such that ðiÞ for all t, ðx t ; y t Þ solves ð11Þ given f t and ðiiÞ f t solves the difference equation ð6Þ given fx t ; y t gt 51 .
We can collapse the two conditions in definition 1 into one:
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The dynamical system ð14Þ describes the evolution of the debt limit in terms of itself. This system is forward looking, naturally, in the sense that the debt limit in one period depends on the debt limit in the next period. Equilibria are characterized by nonnegative bounded solutions to ð14Þ, from which one can solve for the allocation using ð11Þ. This completes our description of the baseline model.
III. Results
A stationary equilibrium, or steady state, is a fixed point f ðfÞ 5 f. Obviously f 5 0 is one such point, associated with ðx; yÞ 5 ð0; 0Þ. Intuitively, if there is to be no credit in the future, you have nothing to lose by reneging, so no one will extend you credit today. A nondegenerate steady state is a solution to f ðf s Þ 5 f s > 0. The mild assumption U 1 x ð0; 0Þh 0 ð0Þ 1 U 1 y ð0; 0Þ > lð1 2 bÞ=bp guarantees the following. Proposition 1. There exists at least one positive steady state, f s 5 f ðf s Þ > 0. If f ðy * Þ < y * , the repayment constraint is binding at any steady state.
All proofs are in Appendix A, but the existence result is easy to understand from figures 1A and B. In figure 1A , the debt constraint in steady state is slack, f s ≥ y * , and in figure 1B, it is binding, f s < y * . Note that f ðfÞ is not necessarily monotone for f ∈ ð0; y * Þ, so we cannot guarantee uniqueness of a positive steady state f s , in general, although it was unique in all the examples we tried. Some statements of results below proceed as if f s were unique, but this is only to ease the presentation, and the results hold more generally if one replaces the clause "the unique positive" with "the smallest positive" steady state. 7 It is clear that there exist equilibria in which f t → 0, as shown in figures 2A and B. Note that with f t21 on the horizontal and f t on the vertical axis, in these diagrams the curve is f 21 . We draw it this way even though the dynamics are forward looking, with causality running from future to previous periods. In figure 2A , f is monotone, so f 21 is a function; in figure 2B, it is not monotone, so f 21 is a correspondence. When f is monotone, once we pick an initial f 0 ∈ ð0; f s Þ, the sequence ff t g is pinned down. When f is not monotone, over some range for f 0 there are multiple equilibrium paths for ff t g. There are even perfectforesight equilibria in which we start at f s and stay there for any number of periods, until dropping to the lower branch of f 21 , and then f t → 0. This is a serious and escalating credit crunch caused by nothing more than beliefs-a self-fulfilling prophecy. Summarizing this discussion, we have established the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that there is a unique positive steady state f s , and letf 5 arg maxf ðf t Þ subject to f t ∈ ½0; f s . Starting from any f 0 <f , there is a nonstationary equilibrium, and possibly more than one, with f t → 0.
FIG. 2.-Nonstationary equilibria
Now consider two-period cycles, with f 1 and f 2 > f 1 denoting the periodic points. Following standard methods ðsee Azariadis ½1993 for a textbook treatmentÞ, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose that there is a unique positive steady state f s . If f 0 ðf s Þ < 21, there is a two-period cycle with f 1 < f s < f 2 .
We illustrate the previous result with examples using the following functional forms: U 1 ðx; yÞ 5
x 12a 1 2 a 2 y and U 2 ðy; xÞ 5 y 2
For simplicity, for now we set a 5 0. 8 Thus, U 1 is linear, but since U 2 is nonlinear, interesting dynamics still obtain via x 5 hðfÞ. The parameters are not calibrated to be empirically reasonable, only to illustrate some mathematical possibilities ðthis is not to say that the model could not be calibrated more realistically in future workÞ. Examples 1 and 2 show cycles in which f 1 < f 2 < y * and f 1 < y * < f 2 , respectively. Example 1. Let g 5 2:1, b 5 0:4, and p=l 5 6. Then f s 5 0:7194 and there is a two-cycle with f 1 5 0:4777 < y * and f 2 5 0:9357 < y * . See figure 3A .
Example 2. Let g 5 0:5, b 5 0:9, and p=l 5 10. Now f s 5 0:9674 and there is a two-cycle with f 1 5 0:9328 < y * and f 2 5 1:0365 > y * . See figure 3B .
The next example has a three-period cycle, shown in figure 4A . The existence of a three-period cycle implies the existence of cycles of all orders by the Sarkovskii theorem, as well as chaotic dynamics by the Li-Yorke theorem ðagain see Azariadis 1993Þ. Chaos is observationally equivalent to a stochastic process for f t . Hence, debt limits, investment, and consumption can appear random when they are not ðsee fig. 4BÞ . Note that credit limits are marked by x's in the figure. As one can see, there are recurrent episodes with three or four periods of unconstrained credit followed by a crunch, as well as episodes with three periods of tight credit followed by easy credit. Hence, compared to equilibria with two-period cycles, these chaotic equilibria can have much more intricate dynamics.
Example 3. Let g 5 0:8, b 5 0:9, and p=l 5 15. Now f s 5 0:9835, and there is a three-cycle with f 1 5 0:9464 < y * , f 2 5 1:0516 > y * , and f 3 5 1:1684 > y * .
The next result says that in any cycle we must have f t < y * at some point over the cycle, but not necessarily at all points. In other words, the debt limit binds infinitely often. journal of political economy Prðs t11 5 1js t 5 1Þ 5 j 1 and Prðs t11 5 2js t 5 2Þ 5 j 2 . The economy is in state s at date t if s t 5 s. Let V j s;t be type j's value function in state s at date t, and let ðx s;t ; y s;t Þ be the state-contingent credit allocation. Then V 1 s;t 5 U 1 ðx s;t ; y s;t Þ 1 b½j s V 1 s;t11 1 ð1 2 j s ÞV 1 2s;t11 ; ð16Þ 952 journal of political economy V 2 s;t 5 U 2 ðy s;t ; x s;t Þ 1 b½j s V 2 s;t11 1 ð1 2 j s ÞV 2 2s;t11 :
The generalized repayment constraint is
Equilibrium in state s at date t is given as follows:
if f s;t < y * ; then x s;t 5 hðf s;t Þ and y s;t 5 f s;t ; if f s;t ≥ y * ; then x s;t 5 hðy * Þ and y s;t 5 y * :
The analogue to ð6Þ is f s;t21 5 j s b½ðp=lÞU 1 ðx s;t ; y s;t Þ 1 f s;t 1 ð1 2 j s Þb½ðp=lÞU 1 ðx 2s;t ; y 2s;t Þ 1 f 2s;t :
This defines a bivariate dynamical system:
Definition 2. A sunspot equilibrium is given by nonnegative and bounded sequences of credit limits ff s;t gt 51;s51;2 and contingent contracts fx s;t ; y s;t gt 51;s51;2 such that ðiÞ ðx s;t ; y s;t Þ solves ð19Þ given f s;t for all t and s and ðiiÞ ðf 1;t ; f 2;t Þ solves the difference equation ð20Þ given fx s;t ; y s;t gt 51;s51;2 .
A proper sunspot equilibrium has f 1;t  f 2;t for some t. Consider proper sunspot equilibria that depend only on the state, not on the date, given by ðf 1 ; f 2 Þ with f 2 > f 1 . Then the repayment constraint is binding in state 1; otherwise, we have x s 5 x * and y s 5 y * in both states, which implies f 1 5 f 2 . Following standard methods ðagain see Azariadis 1993Þ, one can show that proper sunspot equilibria exist when f 0 ðf s Þ < 21, the same condition for two-period cycles, and so the examples with cycles also have sunspot equilibria. Formally, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Suppose that there is a unique positive steady state f s . If f 0 ðf s Þ < 21, then there exist ðj 1 ; j 2 Þ, j 1 1 j 2 < 1, such that the economy has a proper sunspot equilibrium with f 1 and f 2 in the neighborhood of f s and Markov transitions given by Prðs t11 5 1js t 5 1Þ 5 j 1 and Prðs t11 5 2js t 5 2Þ 5 j 2 .
endogenous credit cycles
If the conditions in proposition 5 are satisfied, one of the credit regimes can be highly persistent: when j 1 is big, for example, the economy can stay in a regime in which debt limits are tight for a long time before switching to the other regime. The sunspot equilibria guaranteed by the proposition satisfy j 1 1 j 2 < 1, however, so they cannot have both regimes highly persistent. This does not mean that it is impossible to generate sunspot equilibria in which j 1 and j 2 are both big; they are just not guaranteed by the proposition.
IV. Discussion
The existence of equilibria with deterministic or stochastic cycles relies on the nonmonotonicity of f ðf t Þ. To understand this, recall that
An increase in the debt limit at t 1 1 influences the economy at t in two ways. First, it directly raises f t through the linear term bf t11 . This effect in isolation works against cycles; for example, for f t11 > y * , the allocation ðx t11 ; y t11 Þ does not depend on f t11 , so only the linear term in ð21Þ is operative, and the system f t11 5 ð1=bÞf t is explosive. But there is a second, nonlinear, effect coming from U 1 ðx t11 ; y t11 Þ, which is ambiguous in general and negative when f t11 is near y * . 9 Proposition 6. With Walrasian pricing, yU 1 ½hðfÞ; f=yf < 0 at f 5 y * 2 ε for some ε > 0 if y is a normal good for type 2.
Heuristically, in Walrasian equilibrium, a buyer of good y is always better off under the restriction y ≤ y * 2 ε for some ε > 0, for the same reason that monopolists produce less than competitive suppliers. Pursuing the monopolist analogy, we do not suggest that ε has to be smallthat is merely a sufficient condition for the envelope theorem-and the borrowers may be better off for relatively big ε, just not too big. While debt limits can make borrowers better off, they cannot make everyone better off. For small ε, lenders lose, and for sufficiently tight debt limits, everyone loses ðconsider f 5 0Þ.
When the nonlinear term in ð21Þ is negative and big, f ðf t11 Þ can be decreasing. We now present conditions guaranteeing that the system satisfies the condition for cycles, f 0 ðf s Þ < 21. We start by defining the elasticity hðfÞ 5 f U 1 ½hðfÞ; f yU 1 ½hðfÞ; f yf :
Corollary 1. If hðy * Þ < 21, then we can always pick b and p=l to generate cycles.
It is not hard to satisfy this elasticity condition. 10 If U 1 5 log ð1 1 xÞ 2 A logð1 2 yÞ and U 2 5 log ð1 1 yÞ 2 A logð1 2 xÞ, for A ∈ ð0; 1Þ, hðy * Þ < 21 iff A >Â , whereÂ ≃ 0:132. Basically, hðy * Þ < 21 allows us to choose bp=ð1 2 bÞl close to y * =U 1 ðx * ; y * Þ so that f s is near y * and then pick b and p=l to guarantee f 0 ðf s Þ < 21. Although this is not a quantitative paper, we mention that having p=l and b makes it easier to construct interesting examples. This is not surprising but is relevant because in future quantitative work it may be useful to allow the monitoring probability p, which is absent in most related models, to play a role.
To say more about conditions to guarantee cycles, reconsider the functional forms in ð15Þ, where now a ∈ ½0; 1Þ. Also assume ð1 2 aÞg > ð1 1 gÞa. Then we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Given the parameter restrictions listed above, there is a unique positive steady state f s > 0, and there are cycles around f s if b < gð1 2 aÞ 2 að1 1 gÞ a 1 g and
Corollary 3. As a special case, a 5 0 implies that cycles exist if p=l > 1 1 ð2 1 gÞ=bg.
While it is hard to identify parameter conditions for a local bifurcation around f s , in general, given these functional forms, we get f 0 ðf s Þ < 21 when p=l is in the interval defined in corollary 2. When a 5 0, so that U 1 is linear, all we need is p=l > 1 1 ð2 1 gÞ=bg. In this case, credit cycles are more likely to emerge when b and p=l are big. It may be surprising that cycles are more likely when agents are patient, the temptation to default is low, and the monitoring probability is high, but that is what we find in this specification.
The last item to discuss is the economic interpretation. In the baseline model, type 2 produces 1's consumption good, while type 1 produces intermediate goods, invests, and repays 2 from the proceeds. For concreteness, consider an example suggested by the editor. Agent 1 is a contractor whom agent 2 wants to do some work on his house. Agent 1 needs to be paid x in advance; then he invests in supplies, or working capital, generally. There is a cost to agent 2 of providing x, which can be a production cost or an opportunity cost of consuming less himself. Agent 1 promises to deliver home improvements/repairs using his labor y, but as usual, he is tempted to renege for the opportunistic payoff ly. So we impose the constraint ly 1 ð1 2 pÞbV 1 t11 ≤ bV 1 t11 , saying that the contractor prefers to do the work rather than renege and risk ruining his reputation, which occurs with probability p, say because homeowners report bad behavior only probabilistically. Hence, there is a maximum y 5 f that agent 1 can credibly commit to deliver. Our analysis implies that this example has equilibria in which f t displays complicated dynamics. 11 We like having production and investment in the model because it is interesting to know that there can be endogenous dynamics in these variables, and in aggregate output, that cannot arise in pure-endowment specifications. However, similar results apply to endowment economies. Consider a simple Kehoe-Levine economy, where type 1 agents are endowed with one unit of a generic good in the second subperiod and type 2 with a unit in the first. There is no production or investment. Agents all want to consume in both subperiods. If 1 gets x t from 2 in the first subperiod and gives him y t in the second, payoffs are U 1 5 uðx t Þ 1 vð1 2 y t Þ and U 2 5 uð1 2 x t Þ 1 vðy t Þ, which is a special case of our general setup. The value functions still satisfy ð1Þ and ð2Þ, while the repayment constraint becomes vð1Þ 2 vð1 2 y t Þ ≤ bpV 1t11 ; f t , or y t ≤ g ðf t Þ with g ðf t Þ 5 1 2 v 21 ½vð1Þ 2 f t . The interpretation of f t here is slightly different, compared to the baseline model, where f t was the maximum credible promise, because the deviation payoff is now nonlinear. Still, following the steps taken above, we get
System ð23Þ is similar to ð14Þ, except now the debt constraint is y ≤ g ðfÞ, while in the baseline model it is y ≤ f. To get cycles, we need f 0 ðf s Þ < 21, which in this version means that g 0 ðfÞ is big. Since g 0 ðy * Þ 11 While we can imagine a variety of other applications, contracting with contractors is one that many people have experienced firsthand. In fact, the editor's suggestion was actually more along the lines of MacLeod and Malcomson ð1993Þ: A firm needs to hire workers before profits are realized, with only the promise of future wages. The firm may renege but faces punishment, like any other defaulter. Hence, there is a maximum credible wage promise. The main difference in these applications concerns who has a first-mover disadvantage: the household paying a contractor x up front and hoping to receive y or an individual working in advance and hoping to get paid. Again, it is easy to imagine other applications along these lines. 5 1=v 0 ð1 2 y * Þ, we need v 0 ð1 2 y * Þ small. Given this, all the results hold, although the algebra was easier when deviation payoffs and hence the repayment constraints were linear. To be clear, usually pure-credit models have two types, one endowed with 1 in even periods and 0 in odd periods and vice versa for the other, while we have them endowed this way across subperiods. That is not crucial: Kehoe and Levine use U 5 uðc t Þ 1 buðc t11 Þ 1 Á Á Á, while we use U ðx t ; y t Þ 1 bU ðx t11 ; y t11 Þ 1 Á Á Á in general and U ðx t ; y t Þ 5 uðx t Þ 1 vðy t Þ as a special case, but one can simply reinterpret two periods in their model as one period in ours, with a different b.
We can also map our setup into a model of secured lending, as in Kiyotaki and Moore ð1997Þ. In the first subperiod, type 1 is endowed with C units of a good he likes but type 2 does not, while type 2 is endowed with K units of a good that can be consumed by both types or used as capital to produce more goods in the second subperiod via technology F ðK Þ. For simplicity, K and goods fully depreciate across periods. Type 1 considers both goods perfect substitutes but consumes only in the second subperiod, while type 2 values goods in both subperiods. If type 1 borrows x from 2 and promises to repay y, U 1 5 F ðxÞ 2 y 1 c 2 C , where c is the consumption of his endowed goods. We subtract C from his utility function, so his utility in autarky is normalized to zero. Alternatively, c 2 C is his consumption over and above his endowment ðthink of him as a profit-maximizing producer/investorÞ. Type 2's payoff is U 2 5 U 2 ðK 2 x; yÞ ðthink of him as a consumer/saverÞ. To secure a loan, type 1 pledges C as collateral: if he delivers y to the lender, he gets C back; otherwise he gets f ðxÞ 2 ð1 2 lÞy 2 C , as the lender gets a fraction of what he was promised, while he takes the rest and forfeits his collateral plus future credit with probability p.
The relevant constraint becomes F ðx t Þ 2 y t 1 bV 1 t11 ≥ F ðx t Þ 2 ð1 2 lÞy t 2 C 1 ð1 2 pÞbV 1 t11 ;
or the following linear transformation of our baseline constraint,
If p 5 0, this is a simple model of collateralized lending à la Kiyotaki-Moore; if C 5 0, this is a special case of our baseline model. Following the same steps, we again get a system similar to ð14Þ:
endogenous credit cycles By virtue of ð24Þ, the equilibrium credit limit is at least C =l. Hence, we lose the no-credit equilibrium ðas in the original Kehoe-Levine model, where they endowed agents with assets that can be confiscated in the event of defaultÞ. Intuitively, even if there were no future credit, you would repay a debt of y < C =l today to avoid forfeiting valuable collateral. We also lose dynamic equilibria converging to a no-credit equilibrium. But that does not affect our main results. As long as p > 0, all the results on cycles continue to hold as long as C is not too big, simply by continuity ðpayoffs and behavior over a cycle around the positive steady state do not depend critically on what happens near the originÞ. We mention this not only to show the flexibility of the framework but to make the following point: What generates interesting dynamics is the forward-looking nature of credit markets. If p 5 0, there is only secured lending, as in Kiyotaki-Moore, and hence no endogenous dynamics. However, that is particular to the simplicity of this example, as Kiyotaki-Moore models more generally can also generate endogenous cycles ðsee, e.g., He, Wright, and Zhu ½2013 or Rocheteau and Wright ½2013 for recent examplesÞ.
V. Conclusion
This paper has developed a framework to study dynamics in lending, production, and investment. There always exist multiple steady states and multiple dynamic equilibria in the baseline model. There can exist deterministic, chaotic, and stochastic cycles, where credit conditions fluctuate even though fundamentals are deterministic and time invariant. Even if we add features, such as collateral, that rule out the no-credit equilibrium and paths that converge to the no-credit equilibrium, cycles still exist.
The key friction in the theory is limited commitment, although there are other ingredients, including imperfect monitoring. Still, the model is simple to use. One reason is that equilibrium allocations reduce to a sequence of two-period ðor two-subperiodÞ credit arrangements, although the economy goes on forever. The setup is also quite flexible and can easily accommodate both price taking and bargaining. We provided several interpretations, including pure-credit economies, as well as those with production and investment.
Of course, we made some strong assumptions, including our assumption of perfect-foresight or rational expectations. Obviously, if one relaxes these assumptions, even more exotic equilibria could arise; the goal here was to show that even with the discipline of rational expectations, one can get complicated dynamics. It would be interesting to see if combinations of fundamental shocks and the endogenous dynamics emphasized here might generate empirically plausible cycles. This and other quantitative work is left to future research. As a final remark, we want to emphasize that the mathematics used here is neither new nor difficult and has been applied in many earlier papers to monetary and other models ðrecall n. 3Þ. Our contribution was not meant to be technical but to present a novel economic application to credit markets. Some further progress has been made along these lines in recent work by He et al. ð2013Þ and Rocheteau and Wright ð2013Þ, where similar methods are applied to markets for financial assets and markets for housing.
Proof of Proposition 6
If f 5 y * , equilibrium is on the contract curve and 2U 1
x =U 1 y 5 2U 2 x =U 2 y 5 y=x. A calculation implies yU 1 ½hðfÞ; fx yf
The term outside the brackets is negative. The term in brackets is positive as long as y is normal for type 2. QED
The steady state is constrained if and only if p=l < ð1 2 aÞð1 2 bÞ=ab. A calculation implies f 0 ðf s Þ < 21 if and only if p=l > 1 1 ½ð1 1 gÞ 1 ð1 2 aÞ=bða 1 gÞ. For these to hold simultaneously, we need b < ½gð1 2 aÞ 2 að1 1 gÞ=ða 1 gÞ with b > 0 as ð1 2 aÞ=a > ð1 1 gÞ=g. QED
Appendix B
Bargaining
Here we show that a model with bargaining can generate the same type of dynamics. For ease of presentation, assume that each type 1 meets a random type 2 at each date, and they negotiate a contract ðx t ; y t Þ, taking as given what happens in all other meetings. Generalized Nash bargaining determines ðx t ; y t Þ. Note that the strategic foundations of Nash bargaining are not straightforward in nonstationary situations ðsee, e.g., Coles and Wright 1998; Ennis 2001 Ennis , 2004 Coles and Muthoo 2003Þ . Thus, we are taking the Nash solution as a primitive, and there is no claim here that it is derived from a strategic bargaining game as in standard stationary models. That said, there is no presumption that one could not generate interesting dynamics with some strategic bargaining model, such as the ones used in the above-mentioned papers, but that is not the goal here. Let type 1's bargaining power be v, and let threat points be given by continuation values. Since the continuation values and threat points cancel, the bargaining outcome solves the simple problem max ðxt ;yt Þ U 1 ðx t ; y t Þ v U 2 ðy t ; x t Þ 12v subject to ð5Þ:
If we ignore the repayment constraint for a moment, the solution ðx * ; y * Þ satisfies vU 1 x ðx t ; y t ÞU 2 ðy t ; x t Þ 1 ð1 2 vÞU 1 ðx t ; y t ÞU 2 x ðy t ; x t Þ 5 0; ðB2Þ vU 1 y ðx t ; y t ÞU 2 ðy t ; x t Þ 1 ð1 2 vÞU 1 ðx t ; y t ÞU 2 y ðy t ; x t Þ 5 0:
If f t ≥ y * , we can implement the unconstrained contract; if f t < y * , let x t 5 hðf t Þ solve ðB2Þ with y t 5 f t . Equilibrium satisfies ð11Þ, exactly as in the Walrasian model.
When y ≤ f binds, we have yx yf 5 2vðU 1 xy U 2 1 U 1 x U 2 y Þ 2 ð1 2 vÞðU 1 y U 2
which is ambiguous, in general. So is
but it is unambiguous that yU =yf < 0 for f close to y * if v < 1 and y is a normal good for both types. It is worth mentioning that bargaining with v 5 1 implies yU 1 =yf > 0, in which case we cannot get endogenous cycles; the same is true for bargaining with Kalai's proportional solution. With generalized Nash and v < 1, however, since yU =yf < 0 for f close to y * , we get results similar to what we found with price taking. In particular, it is a matter of writing down the appropriate dynamical system and using the same methods to generate endogenous cycles, even though the economic forces are different, as discussed in the introduction.
Appendix C Alternative Elasticity Conditions
Here, at the request of the editor and referee, we present an alternative condition to guarantee the existence of cycles, in terms of the elasticity of credit supply. From ð13Þ, we have yU 1 ½hðfÞ; f yf 5
The left-hand side is yU 1 ½hðfÞ; f=yf 5 U 1 x dh=yf 1 U 1 y . Around ðy * ; x * Þ, we have That is, around the unconstrained steady state, the elasticity of credit supply is less than one.
The ðutilityÞ elasticity hðfÞ defined just before corollary 1 can be rewritten 
